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JURISDICTION 
Ihis Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 78-2-2 (h). 
Appellant moves that this Court consider his petition and grant appropriate 
relief. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Due Process of law 
2. Abuse of discretionary powers 
3- Ineffective counsel 
*h Cruel and unusual punshment 
5. Equal Protection under the law 
6. Separation of Powers 
7. Cumulative Punishments 
I 
NATURE OF CASE 
The Appellant, HOWARD DALE YOUNG, is an inmate at the UTAH STATE PRISON. 
He plead guilty to the offense of Automobile Homicide on Nov 15, 1988 in 
the Second Judicial Court in Davis County, JUDGE DOUGLAS L. CORNABI presided. 
Case No. 6III. He was sentenced to a 0~5 year sentence. The sentence was 
proper and was not appealled. 
Appellant having been advised by counsel and informed of the re-
commendation to the Court by the probation deptment, was led to believe by 
both, that a 12-18 month incarceration at the UTAH STATE PRISON would be 
the outcome and consequence of his plea, 
Appellant met with the UTAH STATE BOARD OP PARDONS on the 3 day of Fteb. 
1989 and was required to serve the entire 60 month sentence. No parole date 
was given, he was required by said Board to serve his maximum amount of 
time, he could be required to serve. Error in Appellants record may have 
caused the Boards decision, (or) an abuse of discressionary power caused 
such a drastic discision. 
Since decisions by the BOARD OF PARDONS are not grievable and all 
decisions are final and not subject to review, a petition for a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus was filed in the THIRD JUDICIAL COURT of which had jurisdic-
tion of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Young is a 60 year old man with no criminal history. After 
the accident which he caused occured, Mr. Young had feelings of guilt and 
felt that incarceration and rehabilitation was just. 
His Attorney, Mr. ROBERT VAN SEIVER esq. of Salt Lake City Utah, was 
retained to advise and represent him at his court proceedings. 
In past years, the offense of Automobile Homicide had been treated by 
the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS as a serious offense, but had followed the 
guidlelines which they had initiated in November of 1987, unless previous 
crimes and criminal history indicated more severe punishment. 
When appellant appeared before the BOARD OF PARDONS, they required 
him to serve his entire sentence. 
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Appellant discovered that his Son's past criminal history had 
erroneously been included in his (Appellant's) record. 
Verification of same is attached to his petition. 
Since the BOARD OF PARDONS decisions are final and not subject to 
review, and not grievable through prison channels, this action, 
( one of last resort )is presented for review. The petition was denied 




DUE PROCESS OF LAW 
In EYITTS V. UJCEY, 469 us 387, 83 L Ed 2d 821, 105 S CT 830 para 
(3c) it states: 
The right to appeal would be unique 
among state actions if it could be 
withdrawn without consideration of 
applicable due (469 us 401) process 
norms. 
And Similarly: 
A state has great discretion in 
setting policies governing parole 
decisions, but it Must nonetheless 
make those decisions in accord with 
the Due Process Clause, 
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 us 471, 481 - 484, 33 L ED 2d 484, 92 S 
CT 2593 (I977). 
See also GRAHM v. RICHARDSON , 403 us 365 374, 29 L ED 2d 534, 91 S CT 
1848 (1971)? BELL v, BURSON, 402 us 535, 539, 29 L ED 2d 90, 91 S CT 
1586 (I97I)| SHERBERT v. VERNER, 374 us 398, 404, 10 L ED 2d 965, 83 
S CT 1790 (I963)| JOINT ANTI-FACIST REFUGES COMMITTEE v. McGRATH,34l 
us 123, I65-I66, 29 L ED 2d 532, 91 S CT 1848 (195) and the Honorable 
FRANK FURTER concering. In short: 
When a State opts to act in a field 
where it's actions has significant 
discretionary elements it must 
nonetheless act in accord with the 
dictates of the Constitition— and, 
in particilar, in accord with the Due 
Process Clause. 
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Since the decisions of the BOARD OF PARDONS are final and not subject 
to review; See Utah Code 77-27-5 Due process has been denied. All decision 
made by an appointed board must be reviewable. 
POINT 2 
ABUSE OF DISCRESSONAKf POWER 
Because of the duration of time required to serve by the Appellant, 
equal to a much greater offense, the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS has 
abused their powers granted by the Legislature of the State. The State of 
Utah applied for and received Federal Grants (2), to enable the Commission 
Of Criminal and Juvenile Justice to proqulmate and follow guidelines 
recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Committee, as a result of the U.S. 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984-. The new guidelines, as developed by the 
caseworker of Appellant Young was 12 months. 
To require a 60 year old man with no criminal history to serve (5) 
times the guidilines is an abuse of both power and authority, it can be 
read no other way. 
POINT 3 
INEFFECTIVE COUNSEL 
Appellant's Attorney, by failing to substatiate the Criminal record 
presented to both the Probation Dept and the Court, and later to the 
UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS, showed a lack of interest in his client. 
To allow his client to plead guilty without a trial, without receiving 
consideration ( a lesser charge) was also inappropriate. 
Citing WAINWRIGHT v. TORNA, k$$ us 586, 587-588, 71 L ED 2d *±75t 
102 S CT 1300 (1982) (per curium): 
The Court acknowledges that "(of) course, 
the right to effective counsel is de-
pendant on the right to counsel itself" 
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POINT *t 
GRUEL AND UNUSUAL HJNISHMENT 
To require a person 60 yrs. old to serve a (5) year sentence for 
an unintentional crime can only be read as both cruel and unusual. 
It is equivalent to a federal 2d degree murder charge and possibly 
is a life sentence. The perimeters also reflect injustice toward 
other constititional protections, (i.e.), equal protection, due process 
and cumulative punishment: the intent of the court was over ridden by 
an over zealous BOARD OF PARDONS who singled out Appellant Young to 
send a message to the Community. 
Although Appellate Courts do not disturb a sentence within 
statutory limits they may intercede when it raises a constitutional 
question. See SOIEM J. HELM, 463 u.s. 277, 303 (1983) it states: 
Gross disproportionality between crime and sentence constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. Asos 
UNITED STATES v. MESSER, 785 F. 2d 832, 83^ (9th Cir. 1986) states: 
"appellate review proper when sentence possibly based on false or 
inaccurate information in pre-sentence report since due process rights 
violated if district court relied on inaccurate information." Furthermore, 
the United States Supreme Court has said that a punishment that does 




The law permits both the prosecutor and the defendant to appeal 
sentences imposed from incorrect application of the guidelines. The 
Supreme Court of the United States has held that when a statute provides 
specific guidelines for placing prisoners in detention, a prisoner has 
a protected liberty interest, and that once an interest is classified 
as protected, a court must determine what due process protections are 
required. The same would hold true for an equal protection issue. 
6 
The guidelines devoloped by the United States Sentencing Committee 
to help Judges decide the lenth of sentences imposed are; for less 
serious offenses ( a third degree felony) are less than (3) years. 
Yet the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS has required Appellant to serve 
(5) 
I n
 BOARD OF PARDON v. ALIEN, 107 S CT 2^ +15 (l98?) the Supreme Court 
held that when "criterias are met" the BOAHD OF PARDONS "shall" release 
prisoners. In Appellant Young's case the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS 
did not. 
All equal protection statutes would clearly indicate justice has 
been withheld by the State of Utah. In UNITED STATES v. YOUNG 470 u.s. I 
(1985) the court held that identified plain error that seriously affect 
fairness, integrity, public reputation or judicial proceedings or which 
would result in a miscarriage of justice should be recognised. 
Equal protection as related to conditions of confinement are not 
in question, however; to require Appeallant to serve more time than 
inmates guity of much greater offenses is a violation of his rights. 
Numerous inmates in the State of Utah , guilty of Manslaughter both 
first and second degree have spent far less time incarcerated than 
Appellant. The equal protection violation could not be more clear. 
Attached to Appellants original complaint a (5) newspaper clippings 
of similar crimes where the defendants all charged with class A Mis-
demeours and served less than I year incarcerated. 
POINT 6 
SEPARATION OF PffrfER 
The State of Utah, through its BOARD OF PARDONS, violates the 
Separation of Powers requirements established by the U.S. Constitution. 
All decision made by any appointed group must be reviewable. The 
BOARD OF PARDONS is an appointed Board, yet their decisions are not 
subject to review. Tills violates the constitution protection provided 




Although the sentencing Judge's expectation of the future coarse 
of parole proceedings is not a fundamental defect subject to attack, 
in POOR THUNDER v. UNITED STATES, 810 P. 2d 817, 822 (8th Cir 1987) 
stated that: 
"Violation of need for factual accuracy 
in presentencing investigation report is 
a fundamental defect." 
The pre-sentence report of Appellant was incorrect, it may have 
caused probation to be withheld. 
In determing or deciding it and when a parole date should be 
given, the judgement was taken from the Court. The Parole Board also 
was given improper information and a form of Jeopardy was created 
in that cumulative punishment was judicated toward Appellant, Here; 
extreme punishment was given by the Judge. It was again administered 
by the UTAH STATE BOARD OF PARDONS. 
See CRIST v. BRIBTZ, k37 u.s. 28, 33 (1978), which states: 
"Society's interest in protecting the 
intigrity of final judgements has also 
been articulated a policy justification 




The lower Court did not allow Appellant Young to state his case. 
Due process was denied by that Court as it was by the UTAH STATE BOARD 
OF PARDONS. 
The fact that the UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS have violated his rights 
by not following their own guidlines is obvious. In order for Appellant 
to receive a fair and just outcome of his plea as explained to him at 
the time of his plea; and to insure that this abuse of discressonary 
power does not happen to others, and to insure equal treatment under 
the law, Appellant Young's guilty plea should be reversed. The Sentence 
should be vacated. 
RESJECTFULL* submitted this / 7 day of October, 1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of this document 
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